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Abstract  Their simulation analysis provides  insight into the
This paper  explores  changes  in  traditional  com-  comparative  effects  of these policy approaches  on
modity programs from the perspective of domestic  income level and stability. They concluded  that sta-
welfare.  A theoretical  model was  developed which  bilization  policy is superior  to historical  policy in
describes domestic welfare changes that follow from  reducing  income variability and superior to market-
policies  consistent with reductions  in international  determined  policy for purposes  of generating farm
price distortions. The model was applied to the 1985  income. Despite the advantages  of the stabilization
Farm Bill. This provided an historical example of a  approach from an economic viewpoint, the adoption
policy change that simultaneously improves domes-  of a policy that bears no relationship to production
tic welfare and reduces protectionism.  is handicapped politically because it has the appear-
ance of a welfare program.
Key words:  decoupling, welfare,  wheat, corn  This  paper  explores  possibilities  for  improving
~~Historically,  the  nite  Stadomestic  welfare  and reducing trade distortions si-
H1istorically,  the  United  States  government  has  multaneously through modification of existing com-
employed a variety of policy instruments to promote  modity programs. The focus here is on grains, since
the domestic goal of farm income support. The re-  the bulk of U.S.  government support is designated
sponse of government  over six decades  to agricul-  for that sector. Furthermore, since the U.S. is a large
tural sector interests has had massive redistributional  country in the international  grain trade, prices in the
consequences  for taxpayers and consumers as well  U.S. drive world prices (Gardner, 1987, Chapter 11).
as for farmers.  In addition, the objective of income  The next section describes  policy instruments  and
transfer to domestic  farmers has driven agricultural  establishes  a  theoretical  framework  which  is  fol-
trade  policy  and  in  the  process  produced  a wide  lowed by an examination of welfare  consequences
range of trade distortions.  of  specific policy changes. The theoretical results are
Some recent agricultural  trade liberalization  rec-  applied  to the 1985  Farm Bill and its effects on the
ommendations (Blanford, deGorter, and Harvey; de-  wheat and corn sectors.
Gorter; Grennes) point out that there need not be a
conflict  between the goals of farm income support  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
and freer trade.  These objectives  are compatible if  Policy  instruments  in  the U.S.  grain  sector  are
distortion  between  domestic  and foreign  prices  is  threefold.  Under the loan rate instrument,  the Com-
avoided.  Decoupling  of payments  to farmers  from  modity Credit Corporation (CCC) is required by law
production levels would reduce domestic as well as  to accept grain from eligible producers in exchange
international  price distortions while  retaining  indi-  for a loan price  fixed in  legislation.  The loan  rate
vidual  national  control  over  the  level  of income  therefore  functions  as  a support price.  CCC grain
transfer to farmers.  A radical form of decoupling is  stocks increase  in years when the market price falls
lump-sum payments that bear no direct relationship  below the  loan rate  plus interest.  The government
to production. Alternatively, farm policy reform can  also  provides  subsidies  or  deficiency  payments.
concentrate  on  decreasing  the price  incentives  to  These are the difference between a legislated target
overproduce.  Both  approaches  would  simultane-  price and the higher of the loan rate or the market
ously reduce trade distorting effects.  price. The target price, a guaranteed producer price,
McDowell et al. contrast historical,  market-deter-  provides an incentive to produce the crop. Finally,
mined,  and  sector-wide  stabilization  programs  acreage reduction programs require that farmers set
which decouple  farm  income  support from  farm-  aside a percentage of  base acreage in order to become
level  decision  making  for  the  period  1970-1982.  eligible  for  either  CCC  loans  or  deficiency  pay-
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179ments. Farmers choose to participate in the program  curve can be conceptualized as a function of price pt,
if the expected  benefits of participation exceed the  with P', R, and P" causing shifts in the curve, and the
expected costs. The three policy tools operate simul-  nonparticipant supply curve as a function of price P',
taneously, affording policymakers a variety of policy  with p', R, and P" causing the curve to shift.
options.  Government purchase of grain, Qg (P,  pt), is such
The relevance of the loan rate  to farm policy de-  that the market  will clear at the support  price, P.
pends upon whether or not the market price is higher  Equilibrium occurs where
than the loan rate.  In years when  the market price
remains  above the loan rate, consumers respond to  (3)  Qs = Qd + Q
the market price,  and producers respond to both the
target price and the market price. In years when the  . . . Equation (3) is equivalent to equilibrium condition loan rate effectively supports the market price at the
level set in legislation, it is equivalent to the market 
price and becomes an important tool to which both  (4  Q(Q  Q) 
consumers and producers are responsive.  The theo-
retical model that follows develops this latter case.  or,  excess  supply in  the U.S.  is equal to excess
Consider  the  static  case  of  the U.S.  as  a  large  demand in the rest of the world. The world price of
country  in  the international  market  for grain.  The  grain is equivalent to  the U.S. price,  which is sup-
U.S.  is an exporting  country  that  faces the excess  ported at P' by CCC intervention.
demand of the rest of the world. Assume that supply
is at trend level, that the CCC is acquiring stocks, and  WELFARE EFFECTS OF POLICY
that the loan rate is set such that it operates as a price  CHANGES
floor.  The  government  can  manipulate  supply floor.  The  government  can  manipulate  supply  This section takes a welfare theoretic approach to
through the use of three policy tools. Let P' represent  analyzing the effects of changes  in the policy vari- the  loan rate.  This  is  the price  paid by  domestic  a  . pp  pp  ables. Pioneering work in applying this approach to consumers and foreigners purchasing U.S. grain, and agricultural programs was done by Wallace (1962) it is also the price received by nonparticipating  sup-  by  ae  (19 with more recent contributions  by Gardner  (1983)
pliers. The target price, pt, is the price received by  and Lichtenberg  and Zilberman (1986)
suppliers  who participate  in the government  pro-
gram by agreeing to set aside a percentage, R, of their  Analysis  begins  with  an  objective  function,  or
base acreage where 0  R  1.  social  welfare  function,  where  producer  surplus,
Thq demand facing suppliers may be described as  consumer surplus, and the net revenue position of the
Treasury resulting from a given policy are the inde-
(1)  Qd (pl) = Qh  (P)  + Qf (I).  pendent arguments.  The interest is in a policy that
reduces trade distortions  in a manner that does not
Qh  is the domestic component of demand and Qf is  compromise  domestic  welfare.  In  evaluating  con-
the foreign  component.  Domestic supply  is repre-  sumer welfare,  we therefore ignore benefits to for-
sented by  eigners. We assume further that welfare weights are
the same  for  all  three  interest  groups.  The  social
(2)  Qs  (Pl, P, R, pa)  = QP (P,  Pt, R, pa) +  welfare function is defined
Qn (pl, P,  R, pa)
(5)  SW = CS + PS + BS
where QP is participating  farmer and Qn is nonpar-
ticipating farmer supply. pa is the price farmers  ex-  where CS is domestic consumer surplus, PS is pro-
pect  to  receive  by  planting  alternative  crops.  ducer surplus accruing to participating and nonpar-
Participant  supply  responds  positively  to  pt,  the  ticipating  farmers, BS  is the federal budget surplus
guaranteed  producer  price;  nonparticipant  supply  and
responds  positively  to  PI,  the  price  received  by
nonparticipants.  An increase in R or a decrease in p  (5a)  CS = - Qh dP'
will reduce the incentive for program participation
and increase the nonparticipant  component of sup-
ply.  Conversely,  a decrease  in P'  or R will induce  (5b)  PS =fQP dPt +SQn  dPl,  and
farmers  to  enroll more  acreage  in the government
program. Both components of supply respond posi-  -P  (  pi)
tively  to  a decrease  in  pa.  The  participant  supply  (5c)  BS = _  Pd  <  <  i
180  (_  (1The first term in the budget surplus expression  is  loan  rate will result in an improvement in welfare
the cost to government  of deficiency payments;  the  expressed in elasticities form is therefore
second term is the cost of the CCC loan program.
The parameter  represents  the value of the grain in  (9)  Qf/ Qd  <  q  (Q/  Qd) + I,11 
the hands of the CCC expressed  as a percentage of
P'; (1  - O)P'  is the real cost to taxpayers of the grain  where  lnI , and 
1 d,l are the loan rate elasticities of
acquisition.  nonparticipating  supply  and  of demand,  respec-
Changes  in  any  of the  policy  instruments  will  tively.  Equation  (9),  the  first  order  condition  for
affect domestic  welfare.  However  only changes in  maximization of domestic welfare with respect to the
variable PI will alter the amount of trade distortion  loan rate, indicates that an improvement in welfare
since world price  as well  as the domestic price is  is possible through use of the loan  rate instrument
supported at that level. For the policy goal of maxi-  while maintaining a constant target price. The lower
mization of social welfare  through use of the loan  the share of exports in disappearance and the higher
rate, the relevant first order condition for a maximum  the demand elasticity, the greater the opportunity for
is  welfare gain through a reduction in the loan rate, as
more  benefit  is  captured  by  domestic  consumers
(6)  aSW/aP'=  through  the  lower price.  The higher  the  loan rate
elasticity of supply of nonparticipants,  the less they
-Qh +JQiPdPt + Qn _ QiPPt + QlPP  + Qp  will be hurt by a lower price.  Lowering of the loan
-(1 - 0) (Q,Pp  + QP + Q n  P1 + Qn _ Qldpl  - Qd)  rate to reduce trade distortions might be particularly
= Q  + QPdP- - Qpp-  Q1lpl + Q dpl  opportune in the case of corn. A large share in world
exports is provided by the U.S., yet most corn pro-
+ 0 (Qg + Q gPI)  = 0,  duced in the U.S. is utilized domestically.
This paper focuses on the loan rate because of its
where  subscripts  indicate  partial  derivatives.  The  direct  effect  on  world  prices.  While  the  goal  of
value of the parameter  0 depends on the amount of  reducing trade distortions can be undertaken through
revenue  the  government  receives  in  future  years  adjustment of this policy tool, the target price instru-
when  stocks may  be  sold in  times of drought  or  ment can be established for the purpose of support-
unanticipated  increase in export demand minus the  ing farm income. Adjustment of the target price will
transaction costs of purchasing  and disposing of the  not affect the world price, which is established at P'
stocks, storage costs, waste, and social costs due to  in the case  we are considering, but it has domestic
disruption of markets into which surpluses are sent.  welfare  and redistributional  consequences.  Partial
Gardner  (1987,  p.  64)  points  out that  these latter  equilibrium effects of changes in this variable for the
costs are high which implies a low value of 0. If the  case 0 = 0 yields the following
value of the stocks is exhausted by the losses, then
0 is equal to zero.'  If this scenario  is adopted, equa-
tion (6) reduces to  (lO)0SW / OP'  = QP +Qd  - QPP t - Q  - Qnp .
In the case of a nonparticipant  supply curve linear
(7)  Qf +  Q1P dP
t - QPPt - Q
n e pl  + QdPl  = 0.  in Pl and  pt, fQndP'  = Qtnp  and
Equation  (7)  can  be simplified  for the case of a  (11)  OSW /  p  = -QtpPt < 0.
participant  supply  curve  linear  in  P'  and Pt.  The
integral  fQLP dPt is equivalent to  the expression  Equation (11)  indicates that reduction of the target
price is welfare improving. Because the cost to gov- QP't  ,and  equation (7) can be rewnritten ernment  of the  deficiency  payments  exceeds  the
benefits to farmers, the target price is an inefficient
(8)  Qf = Q1np  - Qidpl  mechanism for supporting farm income. Direct pay-
ments  that  do  not elicit  an  excess  supply  could
Equation  (8)  implicitly  defines  the  optimal  loan  achieve the same benefit level for farmers at lower
rate. The condition  under which a reduction in the  taxpayer expense.
Incorporation of the potential benefits  due to future  sale of government surplus would require a dynamic  model. The
assumption that 0 equals zero does not imply that government should not purchase stocks at world prices for security purposes.
181The acreage reduction requirement has supply ef-  foreign competitors were guaranteed price increases
fects opposite to those of deficiency  payments. An  which subsequently encouraged increases in produc-
increase in R reduces QP by the incremental set aside  tion.  The Food  Security  Act  (Farm Bill) of  1985
requirement in addition to the acreage that farmers  revised  this legislation  for the next five  years  by
choose to  remove from the program.  This acreage  slashing the loan rates and maintaining higher target
may be used for production of other crops, or it may  prices. The concern  behind the legislation was that
be  planted  with  the  same  crop,  increasing  Qn.  A  the existing program was distorting market signals
larger  R  decreases  participating  producer  surplus  leaving the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage.  The
and increases that of nonparticipants. The effects on  Farm Bill of 1990 more specifically addressed budg-
the budget surplus are positive, due to the decrease  etary pressures by decreasing the acreage eligible for
both in deficiency payments and in government ac-  support payments. The 1985 legislation,  because of
quisitions.  The net welfare  change depends on the  its  focus  on  the loan  rate,  provides  an  excellent
specific supply effects of R. If gains to taxpayers and  example of the use of this policy tool. This section
nonparticipants outweigh losses to participants, then  applies the above theory to the  1985 Farm Bill. Net
acreage controls can be used to counter social losses  welfare is determined by examining the effects of the
due to target prices. The controls offset the increased  policy change on each of the following groups:  do-
production  incentive  brought  about  by the  target  mestic consumers, participating farmers, nonpartici-
price. Simultaneous use of both controls is a second  pating farmers,  and taxpayers. The bulk of the loan
best policy in which one distortion serves to reduce  rate drop went into effect in the 1986/87  crop year.
rather than increase social losses due to the other. For  For  that  reason  the  focus  is  on  welfare  changes
furtherdiscussion ofthe supply effects ofthe acreage  occurring in 1986/87. Table  1 lists the target prices,
reduction  requirement,  see  the work by  McIntosh  loan rates, and percentage acreage reduction require-
and Shideed and by Burt and Worthington.  ments in the wheat and corn sectors for the  1985/86
through  1990/91 crop years.
EMPIRICAL  APPLICATION  Welfare changes for the three affected  groups are
Three major pieces of farm legislation have been  determined in the remainder of this section. In these
passed during the last decade. The 1981  Farm Bill  calculations, all price and income measures are con-
provided for annual increases in loan rates and target  verted to 1985 dollars. A domestic demand function
prices. Because the loan rate drives the world price,  was  estimated  in  order  to  evaluate  domestic  con-
Table 1. Price Support Program:  1985-1991
Acreage Reduction
Requirement / Paid  Land Diversion
Target Price  Loan Rate  Land Diversiona  Payment  Participation Rateb
Wheat
1985/86  4.38  3.30  20.0/10.0  2.70  73
1986/87  4.38  2.40  22.5/  2.5  2.00  85
1987/88  4.38  2.28  27.5/-  - 88
1988/89  4.23  2.21  27.5/-  - 86
1989/90  4.10  2.06  10.0/-  - 78
1990/91  4.00  1.95  5.0/-  - 80
Corn
1985/86  3.03  2.55  10.0/-  - 69
1986/87  3.03  1.92  17.5/  2.5  .73  86
1987/88  3.03  1.82  20.0/15.0  2.00  90
1988/89  2.93  1.77  20.0/10.0  - 87
1989/90  2.84  1.65  10.0/-  - 80
1990/91  2.75  1.57  10.0/-  - 76
Source: USDA, Agricultural Outlook.
aln addition to the target price and loan rate supports, additional payments per bushel foregone were made for a
percentage of the required  acreage diversion for some years.
bPercentage of base acres enrolled in Acreage  Reduction Programs.
182Table 2.  Demand  Estimation for Domestic Disappearance  (DD)a
Equation  Variable  Coefficient  t-ratio  Elasticity
Wheat  Intercept  247  2.68 
Price (dollars per bushel)  -22.7  -3.31  -.170
Real Income  Per Capita (thousands)  13.3  1.44  .178
DD Lagged  .690  5.41  .673
R2 = .890
Durbin h-statistic = .0074
N  =29
Corn  Intercept  1,419  2.69 
(dollars per bushel)  -203  -3.96  .183
Real  Income Per Capita (thousands)  181  3.07  .448
DD  Lagged  .421  2.79  .412
R2 = .866
Durbin h-statistic =  -1.906
N =25
aln million bushels.
and  Worthington  who  drop  the  years  1978-1983
sumer surplus changes. A linear functional form was  fromthdatasetwhichtheyusedtoestimatewheat
chosen to allow for a finite consumer surplus:e  app  imate  we  e
acreage  supply.)  To  approximate  welfare  changes
(12I  h  f(Price, Income, Domestic  -we  construct supply curves for both the wheat and
(12)  Qh = f(Price,  Income, Domestic (12  . fPncerlnco  ms  Lge)corn  sectors and for both participants and nonpartici-
Disappearanc  Lagged).  pants that have the following functional form:
Equation (12) was estimated using annual data from 
the period  1958-1986 for wheat and 1962-1986 for  )  Q = K +  P  + 
corn.  Qh  is  domestic  disappearance,  the  price  of
wheat is the real price of #1  hard red winter wheat  P,  Pb and  Pe  are  the  prices  of  wheat,  corn  and
(Kansas City), and the price of corn is the real price  soybeans, respectively. The values of Q in equation
of #2 yellow corn  (Chicago,  Omaha). Measures of  (13)  are determined  by breaking actual production
these variables were obtained from Wheat:  Outlook  Q  to participant  and nonparticipant components
and Situation Report and Feed:  Outlook and Situ-  as follows
ation Report (USDA).  Income  is  real  disposable
income  per capita.  Data  on this  variable  were  ob-  ()  QP = (PA  / PA)  Q
tained  from the Statistical Abstract of the  United  and
States (U.S. Department of Commerce). The results  (15)  Qn = Q  - QP,
of the OLS demand estimation are listed in Table 2.
Because domestic price elasticities are low, exports  where PAPis participating planted acreage and PA is
play a key role in clearing stocks when the loan rate  total planted  acreage. This decomposition assumes
changes.  that the ratio of harvested to planted acreage is the
The  target  price  mechanism  was  introduced  in  same for participants and nonparticipants.  Measures
1974.  Given how  recently  this policy  was imple-  of the variables used in calculation of QP and Qf  were
mented,  there is only a brief period of time during  obtained from Agricultural Outlook (USDA).2
which all three price support instruments have been  Because the loan rate is in operation as a price floor
in effect. Estimation of their supply effects is there-  during the time period of this analysis, P' is used as
fore difficult. (This difficulty is also reported by Burt  a measure of expected price of wheat and corn at the
2Total planted acreage  (PA) was obtained  directly. The values of actual production  (QS)  and participating  acreage (PA
P) were
calculated as follows: QS = HA *  Y, PA
P = (r * B) -S, where HA (total harvested acreage), r (participation rate), B (base acreage),
and S (acreage set aside) were also obtained directly from the data sources. Y is the value of trend yield, which was estimated from
linear regressions of yield over time performed for the period  1950-86.  The resulting yields for  1985 and 1986 were 37.4 and 38.0 for
wheat and 112.2 and  114.4 for corn.
183Table 3.  Supply Relationshipsa
Price Coefficients
Quantity  Intercept  Wheat  Corn  Soybeans
WHEAT
Participants
1985  1,595  H  1,037  182  -53  -16
1,595  L  1,355  109  -53  -16
1986  1,819  H  1,182  212  -62  -19
1,819  L  1,546  127  -62  -19
Nonparticipants
1985  825  H  536  134  -37  -8.2
825  L  701  80  -37  -8.2
1986  488  H  317  103  -33  -5.2
488  L  414  62  -33  -5.2
CORN
Participants
1985  5,331  H  4,532  -61  704  -211
5,331  L  5,065  -61  528  -211
1986  5,776  H  4,910  -67  778  -247
5,776  L  5,487  -67  583  -247
Nonparticipants
1985  3,106  H  2,640  -50  557  -123
3,106  L  2,951  -50  418  -123
1986  2,140  H  1,820  -45  582  -92
2,140  L  2,033  -45  437  -92
aln million bushels where H  = higher and L = lower elasticity estimates.
time of planting decisions for nonparticipants.  In the  pi outweighed the increase in R in 1986, causing an
participant equation, target prices for wheat and corn  outward shift in the participating supply curve and
are used.3 (The loan rate  for soybeans  was used in  an inward shift in the nonparticipating supply curve.
each equation;  a target price program for soybeans  The  changes  in consumer surplus  and producer
was not in effect.)  The values of a,  P and  5  are  surplus are calculated according to the welfare  ex-
determined  by  incorporating  own-  and cross-price  pressions  contained  in equation  (5)  where  Qh,  QP,
elasticities  used  in  recent  work.4 Given  values  of  and Q" have the functional forms developed above.
quantities, prices, and coefficients, the supply curves  (To isolate the effects of changing prices, the income
are completed by solving for the intercept terms (K)  and domestic disappearance  lagged values are fixed
in  equation  (13).  The  components  of  the  supply  at their  1985  levels.)5 The  budget  surplus as  de-
equations are listed in Table 3.  scribed  in equation (5c) is affected through changes
The supply elasticities of P' and R for participants  in both the cost of deficiency  payments  and of the
and of Pt and R for nonparticipants  are not known.  loan program.  The values of QP and Qn in (5c) are as
Shifts in supply due to changes in these variables are  listed in  Table 3.  CCC  acquisitions  for  1985 and
therefore  captured through  the change in the inter-  1986 were calculated  as follows
cept term.  In both sectors, the.dramatic decrease in  (16)  Qg  Q  + Q  - Qd  ,
3For a discussion of the various ways in shich prices have been measured in supply response equations in the literature see
Shideed  et al.
4See Gardner (1987, pp.. 68-71).  The own price elasticity of wheat is .5 and of corn is .4. The cross price elasticities  for wheat
are -. 1 of corn and -.05 of soybeans.  For corn, the cross price elasticities of wheat and soybeans are -.05 and -.2, respectively.
Alternative estimates of own price elasticities are .3 for both wheat and corn. Each coefficient in (13)  was determined by setting the
appropriate elasticity equal to the coefficient times the ratio of price to quantity.
5Because the CCC loan program does not support the market price at precisely the loan rate, the prices for all 3 crops in the
nonparticipant  equations and for soybeans in both sets of equations are those actually received by farmers. These sets $3.08 and
$2.42 for wheat, $2.23 and $1.50 for corn, and $5.05 and $4.78  for soybeans in 1985 and 1986, respectively  (nominal dollars).
184Table 4.  Summary of Welfare Changes Under  estimated.  For the policy goal of maintaining  farm
the Wheat and Corn Programs for  income  at a lower program cost,  slashing the loan
1985/1986a  rate while retaining high target prices appears to have
Higher  Lower  been counterproductive.
Elasticity  Elasticity  This  analysis has focused  on a period when the
~~~~~~~~~~WHEAT  ~loan  rate was in operation as a support price. In those
years when the market price remains above the loan
Domestic Consumer Surplus  1,209  1,209  rate, the position of the budget surplus will improve
Producer Surplus  -423  -480  because  deficiency  payments  will  be  smaller  and
Participating  616  698  because government will not be required to support
Nonparticipating  -1,039  -1,178  price by acquiring stocks. The role of the target price
Budget Surplus  -714  -714  differs in this case because U.S. participant supply
Change in  Deficiency Payments  -1,970  -1,970  becomes a factor in the determination of world price.
Change in  CCC  Payments  1,256  1,256  In the absence of a binding loan rate  which estab-
lishes world  price,  increased  supplies induced  by
Net Welfare Change  72  15  high target prices have a downward effect on world
CORN  price.  However,  increases in target prices still have
Domestic Consumer Surplus  2,766  2,766  the effect of a loss in domestic social welfare.
Producer Surplus  -2,224  -2,363
CONCLUSION Participating  801  851
Nonparticipating  -3,025  -3,214  This paper examined the potential welfare conse-
Budget Surplus  -85  -85  quences for the U.S. of adjusting policy in a manner
that reduces trade distortions. It has shown that in the
Change in  Deficiency Payments  -4,083  -4,083  case in which the loan rate operates as a price floor,
Change in  CCC  Payments  3,998  3,998  it is possible to improve domestic welfare through
Net Welfare Change  458  319  reducing  loan rates  in the direction of world market
aln millions of  1985 dollars.  prices.  It was  also demonstrated  theoretically  that
lower target prices reduce the cost to taxpayers by an
where  Qd  is  domestic  and foreign  demand  (total  amount that exceeds losses to producers. The model
disappearance).  was  applied  to  the  1985  Farm  Bill  effects  on the
Social welfare changes are listed  in Table 4. The  wheat and corn sectors. The major difficulty in ana-
wheat  sector  shows  a  welfare  gain  of  72  million  lyzing the policy empirically is locating the supply
dollars in the higher elasticity case and of 15 million  curve.  Because program  participation  is voluntary,
in the lower elasticity  case. Corn experienced  gains  farmers face two different price incentives.  Little is
of 458 million dollars in the higher and 319 million  known about the supply responsiveness of producers
dollars in the lower elasticity case. The larger welfare  to the three separate  policy instruments that consti-
gains for corn reflect the lower share of exports in  tute the farm program. More understanding of these
domestic disappearance  of that  crop.  Producers in  relationships  is  needed  in  order  to  design  better
both sectors  are  net  losers  because  the losses  to  policy. The foreign component is also a major factor
nonparticipants  outweigh the gains to participants.  influencing the effects of U.S. programs. This is also
Government is also a net loser since the savings due  an area in need of more research.  Wheat exports in
to  lower  Qg  are  more  than  offset  by  the  cost  of  particular  account  for roughly  one  half of annual
increased  deficiency  payments.  Wheat  receives  disappearance.  Yet because of changing farm poli-
about  8  times  as much  new  support  as  corn;  the  cies in importing and other exporting countries, for-
higher deficiency payments for wheat in 1986 were  eign  demand  is  most  difficult  to  pinpoint,  and
not offset by savings in CCC payments as in the corn  estimates of demand elasticity vary widely.
sector. Although the corn sector shows a significant  This paper  is a partial  analysis of a complicated
welfare gain under the 1986 program, the redistribu-  farm program. It perhaps raises more questions than
tional effect is a substantial shift in favor of consum-  it  answers.  The  static  model  developed  here  has
ers, with a reduction in the welfare of both taxpayers  considered  only  the  case  in  which  the  loan  rate
and producers. It was anticipated that the 1985 Farm  supports  the  market  price.  A  dynamic  model  is
Bill would provide a major boost to foreign demand  needed to handle random supply disturbances which
and a consequent increase in U.S. exports that would  cause market prices to rise above the loan rate. Such
reduce  the burden  on U.S. taxpayers.  The role  of  a model would also be capable of dealing with the
increased exports following the price cuts was over-  issue of the value of grain in the hands of the CCC.
185This study has shown that even with existing policy  are more problematic. The best way to achieve both
tools, there is not necessarily a tradeoff between the  of these ends is to decouple support payments from
goals of domestic welfare and trade distortion reduc-  production levels. This is an important area for fur-
tion. Trade negotiations should focus on the rate of  ther study.  With the very high cost of the U.S. farm
distortion in trade rather than on the rate of protec-  program in a era of continued high budget deficits,
tion of domestic farmers. The two goals of maintain-  such a policy approach demands serious considera-
ing farm income and reducing farm program costs  tion.
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